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ABSTRACT 
As  vessel  traffic  in  the  Baltic  increases,  in  particular  oil  transports  from  Russia  to  the 
international market, so too does the risk of oil spills which above the environmental impacts 
impose costs on society including direct costs, market costs and non-market costs (e.g., losses in 
welfare  from  a  damaged  environment  not  easily  valued  in  a  market).  While  financial 
compensation  addresses  direct  and  market  costs,  environmental  compensation  (compensatory 
restoration)  offsets  welfare  declines  from  the  loss  of  resources  or  the  services  they  provide. 
Although a clear international system for recovering environmental restoration costs from oil 
spills  is  still  un-established,  the  EU's  Environmental  Liability  Directive  (ELD)  from  2007 
introduces a number of useful terms and concepts that may be applicable in the Baltic context. 
The European Commission (EC) funded development of the REMEDE Toolkit to help Member 
States carry out the ELD requirements. The Toolkit provides a useful framework for assessing 
non-market costs associated with oil spill damages by defining the types of ecological losses 
suffered  by  the  public  and  providing  interdisciplinary  methods  for  scaling  resource-based 
compensation projects whose cost should be incurred by the responsible polluter(s). This paper 
suggests that the ELD concepts and REMEDE methods could be transferred to the Baltic to help 
authorities  recover  environmental  restoration  costs  from  responsible  polluters.  We  illustrate 
application of REMEDE-like concepts and methods to oil spill damages in the context of US 
regulations and the UN Compensation Commission and discuss the legal acceptance of these 
methods. The fact that the ELD cannot legally be invoked to address an oil spill in Europe should 
not preclude a discussion about how these relatively new European legal concepts, including the 
REMEDE methodology, could be used to establish a more consistent, transparent, and replicable 
framework for damage assessment in the sensitive marine environment of the Baltic Sea. 
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Vessel traffic in the Baltic Sea has increased dramatically in recent years and an analysis by 
the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Committee shows that an increase in shipping traffic is 
correlated with an increase in accidents, some of which involve oil spills (HELCOM 2009). The 
volume of oil transported through the Baltic has doubled in the last 10 years due in large part to 
the new Russian ports of Primorsk, Vysotsk, and Ust-Luga, which are expected to contribute 
significantly to growth in the coming years. Increasing vessel size means a major accident could 
involve significant amounts of oil (Hassler 2011). The vast majority of oil is transported from 
east to west through the Gulf of Finland, the Baltic Proper and the Danish Straits. Countries 
threatened by oil spills from an accident are Russia, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, 
Poland, Germany, and Denmark.  
Oil  spills  impose  large  costs  on  society.  For  example,  direct  costs  from  accidents  may 
include the market value of oil spilled, damage to the oil tanker, clean up expenditures, repairs to 
infrastructure, etc. These expenditures support activities that are unproductive for the economy -- 
compared  to  investments  in  education  or  health  care  or  expanding  a  port  --  and  therefore 
represent high opportunity costs to society.  
Second, there are market costs imposed on consumers and producers who are dependent on 
natural resources as inputs to production (e.g., commercial fisheries, tourism). Producers suffer 
profit losses while consumers suffer welfare losses from increased prices or reduced quality or 
access
1 to goods and services.  
                                                 
1 Market costs arising from an oil spill also depend on the availability of substitutes, i.e., if a tourist company can 
offer similar services in a nearby area unaffected by an oil spill then the losses from the spill are less than a scenario 
without available substitutes..       3 
 
Finally, damage results in social welfare losses that are not valued in the market, i.e., non-
market  costs.  These  losses  accrue  when  the  public  loses  access  to  non-priced  ecological 
resources (e.g., species) or the services provided by those resources (e.g., habitat for wildlife, 
recreational opportunities, scenic vistas, etc). The lack of a market does not, however, indicate a 
lack of value. Under the assumption that the public has a positive willingness-to-pay (WTP) for 
these types of resources and services, damages impose a social cost (see e.g. World Bank, 2005). 
While financial compensation addresses direct and market costs, resource-based environmental 
compensation (restoration) offsets welfare declines from the loss of resources or the services 
they provide. This paper identifies relevant categories of non-market costs and suggests concepts 
and methods to value these losses for the purpose of scaling environmental compensation.  
Transport at sea plays an important economic role because it is a cost-effective mechanism 
for moving materials from points of extraction/production to points of consumption. However, 
from a societal point of view it is helpful to consider the trade-off between these benefits and the 
costs of possible oil spills. In a well-functioning market these trade-offs are made automatically 
due to the simultaneous interaction of well-informed consumers and producers. However, the 
transport market
2 is characterized by a market failure known as an externality. 
An externality can be defined as an (unintended) positive or negative spill-over effect to a 
third party (e.g. the public) from producing or consuming a good, which is not accounted for in 
the market.
3 To ensure society's scarce resources are used efficiently, these negative externalities 
                                                 
2 We define the transport market to include all vessels that transport oil in bulk or transfer other commodities. 
Although both vessels pose oil spill risks, the potential magnitude of economic damages from the former are 
considerably higher than for the latter. 
3 Noise from a concert or carbon emissions from steel production provide negative externalities. An individual's 
garden may provide positive externalities (improved scenery or increased property values).      4 
 
should  be  internalized  into  firms'  production  decisions.  The  existence  of  externalities  in  the 
transport  market  justifies  policy  intervention  with  the  aim  of  creating  proper  incentives  for 
preventative measures. These may include operator regulations, fines, and/or requirements that 
polluters compensate for losses to firms (profits) and the public (welfare loss). 
Policies that require compensation encourage firms to internalize external environmental 
costs. These policies are motivated by the polluter pays principle (PPP) articulated as part of the 
Rio Declaration (REDED 1992). It was also a driving factor behind the EU's Environmental 
Liability Directive (ELD 2007), which stated that “According to the ‘polluter-pays' principle, an 
operator causing environmental damage or creating an imminent threat of such damage should, 
in principle, bear the cost of the necessary preventive or remedial measures.”  (ELD, Paragraph 
18) 
We argue that current management of the Baltic Sea through the HELCOM initiative “Baltic 
Sea  Action  Plan”  (HELCOM  2007)  and  by  the  IMO  classification  of  the  Baltic  Sea  as  a 
Particular Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) does not adequately implement the PPP. Incentives for 
operators to take adequate preventative measures are limited due, in part, to the fact that current 
damage assessment procedures do not require polluters to compensate for all relevant social costs 
that arise from an oil spill, i.e., direct, market, and non-market (Sanctuary and Fejes 2006). This 
article suggests an oil spill damage assessment framework for identifying, measuring and valuing 
non-market costs based on the EC-funded REMEDE project (Lipton et al 2008). The suggested 
framework is similar to the one used under US Oil Pollution Act and has been used to support the 
UN  Compensation  Commission  assessment  of  oil  spill  damage  from  the  1991  Gulf  War 
(UNCCGC  2005).  Our  analysis  suggests  that  despite  uncertainty  in  the  legal  framework  for 
recovery of environmental restoration costs from polluters in the Baltic (Tegeback et al 2010), the      5 
 
methods and tools are readily available to better address these non-market welfare losses. By 
failing to incorporate these methods into a credible damage assessment framework in the Baltic -- 
together with the necessary legal framework -- the public will continue to bear a disproportionate 
amount of costs from future oil spills in the form of un-repaired environmental damage. 
Section 2 argues for economic efficiency based on internalization of environmental costs. 
Section 3 summarizes the REMEDE methodology that we feel would improve oil spill damage 
assessment in the Baltic. Section 4 illustrates the REMEDE-style approach using examples under 
US, UN, and EU regimes, and discusses legal acceptance of this approach. Section 5 concludes 
and provides policy and research suggestions. 
 
2. COSTS, BENEFITS AND INCENTIVES OF SPILL PREVENTION MEASURES 
How does a transport company decide on the optimal level of spill prevention, given that 
measures are costly but provide economic benefits? (note that benefits come in the form of 
avoided  costs  of  spills,  e.g.,  financial,  environmental,  health,  etc).  Figure  1  illustrates  this 
decision  from  the  microeconomic  perspective  of  a  transport  firm.  We  assume  that,  on  the 
margin, costs of prevention increase as the level of prevention increases, i.e., low-cost measures 
are taken first but more costly measures are required to reduce risk even further. However, 
marginal benefits to the operator decrease as the level of prevention increases, i.e., benefits 
initially accrue rapidly but taper off as additional preventative measures are taken. Thus, the 
private marginal cost curve slopes up, while the private marginal benefit curve slopes down. 
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Figure 1. Costs and benefits of spill prevention measures. 
 
We assume that an operator makes a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of preventative 
measures and chooses the "optimal" level: at m0 the benefit of increasing preventative measures 
by one unit is exactly equal to the cost of increasing preventative measures by one unit. Why not 
proceed to m*? From the operator's perspective, m* implies that the financial cost of doing so is 
higher than the marginal benefit he expects (i.e., "why should I pay for double-hulled ships if it 
increases my costs, but the expected marginal benefit to me is fairly small?").  
It would be better for society if the operator considers the marginal social benefit curve 
rather than his own marginal private benefit curve, as shown in Figure 1. That is, society prefers 
that the operator considers the benefits of avoiding all social impacts associated with an oil spill, 
including not only his loss of profits but others' loss of profits (market costs) and the public's loss 
of environmental resources/services (non-market costs).       7 
 
Because the market itself does not make a socially optimal tradeoff, public policies are 
needed to internalize the externality shown in Figure 1 and move operators toward m*, thus 
reducing the risk of oil spills. These may include operational requirements for transport vessels
4 
or  policies  that  increase  the  marginal  benefits  of  avoiding  spills  (i.e.,  require  polluters  to 
internalize these social costs). 
We advocate more emphasis on policies that increase the private marginal benefit of spill 
prevention in the Baltic by ensuring that oil spill damage assessment procedures account for 
direct, market, and non-market costs. Hasselström & Söderqvist (2008) review studies on the 
costs of oil spill accidents in the Baltic and find that only one (Ahtiainen, 2007) considers non-
market costs. In contrast, two cost models in the US take explicit account of both market and 
non-market costs arising from oil spills (Etkin 2004; Roach and Plater 2001). 
The magnitude of non-market costs in proportion to total costs is unknown, although one study 
in the US suggests significant variation and an upward trend over time (1998 - 2001) of non-
market  costs,  with  an  average  of  about  $100  million  per  year  (study  included  even  non-oil 
damages, see Smith 2003).   
Carson et al 2003 suggest that empirical evidence may support the theory that compensation 
requirements reduce future oil spills. They assert that the costly compensation required of Exxon 
following the 1989 Valdez oil spill may explain the subsequent reduction in the number of very 
large  oil  spills  in  the  US  compared  to  other  countries  during  the  1990s.  That  is,  shipping 
                                                 
4 Studies have shown that double hulls, separated ballast tanks, and certain navigation equipment can help reduce the 
risks of ship accidents in the Baltic (Mitchell 1994; Hassler 2010; Knudsen and Hassler 2011).      8 
 
companies doing business in US waters presumably took new measures to avoid large oil spills, 
thus internalizing these previously external environmental costs. 
 
3. THE REMEDE TOOLKIT AND EQUIVALENCY ANALYSIS (EA) 
The EU's ELD requires that environmental damage in the EU be restored (remediated) so 
that the affected environment returns to (or toward) its baseline condition and the public is 
compensated for the initial damage and the losses during the time it takes for the environment to 
recover (interim loss). To explain these relatively new legal concepts, the European Commission 
funded  REMEDE,  an  interdisciplinary  project  to  formalize  an  approach  for  assessing 
environmental damage called Equivalency Analysis (EA) in Toolkit (Lipton et al 2008). While 
EA is used frequently in the US (NOAA 1995), the aim of REMEDE was to adapt the EA 
approach to the European context. We argue that the REMEDE Toolkit and EA methodology 
provides a framework for damage assessment that can be replicated across oil spill events in the 
Baltic to ensure a transparent and consistent approach for assessing non-market costs. 
EA  determines  how  much  compensation  is  required  to  offset  welfare  losses  due  to 
environmental  damage  by  ensuring  that  the  value  of  the  environmental  gain  (credit)  is 
"equivalent" to the value of the environmental loss (debit) over time, where value is a function of 
the length of time the resource is injured and the metric used (Figure 2). An interim loss (non-
market loss) in social welfare accrues because a resource takes time to recover to its baseline 
level. The interim loss is the non-market portion of the externality shown in Figure 1 as it 
represents the loss to society due to the temporary loss of a resource that is not valued in a 
market.  EA  values  the  public's  loss  of  access  to  a  resource  by  scaling  a  resource-based 
restoration project as compensation such that the Figures' two shaded areas are equal over time.      9 
 
The cost of the compensatory restoration project represents the non-market loss to society from 
environmental damage. 
 
EA  assumes  that  a  reduction  in  the  quality  of  a  resource  from  an  oil  spill  may  be 
compensated  through  an  increase  in  the  quantity  or  quality  of  another  resource.  The  credit 
(Figure 2) represents a quantifiable resource gain beyond a restoration site's current and future 
baseline condition. Without generating additional gains, losses are not compensated, leading to a 
"net loss" of social welfare. Examples of compensatory credits might be resource restoration, 
rehabilitation, enhancement, or re-creation. Alternatively, land conservation represents a credit if 
it prevents an anticipated environmental loss (e.g., development).  
The  concept  of  interim  loss  is  applicable  across  a  range  of  environmental  damages, 
including  short-lived  impacts  from  oil  spills  to  larger  (sometimes  permanent)  impacts  from      10 
 
hazardous releases. Even minor damages from oil releases may lead to interim losses if recovery 
times are protracted (e.g., due to insufficient or ineffective clean up. 
The metric on the Y axis of both Figures -- i.e., the 'currency' used to scale restoration -- 
may  be  monetary  or  non-monetary  (ecological)  (Lipton  et  al  2008).  Non-monetary  scaling 
approaches such as Habitat Equivalency Analysis (HEA) and Resource Equivalency Analysis 
(REA) are often used to measure welfare impacts that arise from pure environmental loss (e.g., 
contaminated  wetlands,  loss  of  individuals  in  a  population)  and  ensures  equivalence  using 
ecological metrics (e.g., acres of wetland, no. of birds). Monetary scaling (Value Equivalency 
Analysis) is often used to measure welfare impacts from the loss of services derived from those 
resources (e.g., beach use, sports fishing, wildlife viewing) and ensures equivalence with the 
help of on nonmarket valuation.  
Nonmarket valuation includes a set of economic methods for assigning a monetary value to 
environmental loss and/or gain. For example, the Travel Cost (TC) method estimates the value of 
changes in an environmental resource by examining the costs individuals are willing to incur to 
travel to recreational sites. The Contingent Valuation (CV) method asks an individual to state the 
amount of money he/she would be willing to pay to avoid a hypothetical environmental loss and 
is collected through in-person or mail surveys (see Carson et al 2003). A Choice Experiment 
(CE)  survey  asks  individuals  to  choose  repeatedly  between  hypothetical  scenarios  of 
environmental loss or gain. These methods allow analysts to estimate the monetary value of 
environmental damage and subsequent restoration (Champ et al 2003) and play an increasingly 
important  role  in  environmental  policy-making  in  general  (USEPA  2009;  TEEB  2010) a n d 
damage assessment in particular, as discussed below. 
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4. USE OF REMEDE-STYLE APPROACHES  
EA  has  been  used  to  estimate  non-market  costs  of  oil  spill  damage  under  US  and  UN 
regimes  and  EU  guidance  suggests  that  EA  can  help  assess  various  types  of  environmental 
damage. Below we summarize these examples and discuss the legal acceptance of EA across 
national and international regimes. 
EA under the US Oil Spill Act - Athos Spill 
In November 2004, the tanker Athos I suffered a hull puncture and released approximately 
265,000  gallons  of  heavy  crude  oil  into  the  Delaware  River  (NOAA  2007).  In  addition  to 
financial compensation, the US OPA required assessment of non-market costs associated with 
damage to: (1) acres of shoreline (mudflats, marshes); (2) acres of aquatic habitat for sediment-
dwelling biota; (3) wildlife (birds, mammals and reptiles); and (4) human use. 
Lost human use included recreational fishing and crabbing, waterfowl hunting, and pleasure 
boating. The spill imposed losses on recreational users who either (1) stayed home (2) visited a 
substitute site or (3) visited the affected area but had a diminished experience. Monetary metrics 
were used to scale compensatory projects to offset these three categories of recreational losses. 
First, potential user groups were contacted to determine how often they visited the impacted 
stretch  of  river  following  the  spill  compared  to  visits  in  a  normal  year.  Second,  nonmarket 
valuation was used to value welfare impacts associated with the three categories of recreational 
loss. For example, the TC and CV methods were used to estimate recreational users' WTP to 
experience a typical fishing, hunting, and boating trip in a similar nearby region and these values 
were transferred to the damage site (see Rosenberger and Loomis 2001).  A lost human use value 
from the spill was calculated by multiplying affected trips by the per trip values. Finally, these 
values were used to scale "... projects that enhance recreational opportunities on the Delaware      12 
 
River, thus compensating lost value with future recreation benefits" (NOAA 2007). In addition 
to this monetary scaling approach for assessing recreational impacts, a non-monetary scaling 
approach was used to assess the other non-market costs (shoreline, aquatic habitat, and wildlife) 
for which compensation was required. 
EA in the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC)  
Following the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq was required to pay compensation for damages to natural 
resources  resulting  from  intentional  oil  spills,  pollutants  from  oil  well  fires,  and  other  war 
activities  (UNCCGC  2005).  Six  countries  submitted  claims  for,  among  other  things, 
environmental damages including "measures ... to clean and restore the environment" (ibid). For 
example,  Kuwait  claimed  costs  for  compensatory  restoration  to  offset  the  interim  loss  of 
resources due to the release of over 11 million barrels of oil on shoreline habitat, marine life and 
fishery  resources.  The  UNCC  Panel  of  Commissioners  recommended  payment  of  the 
compensation claim based on the costs of creating and maintaining a nature preserve to offset the 
loss  of  habitat  services  over  time.  The  Panel  concluded  that  the  size  and  time  period  of 
protection for the preserve scaled using HEA would provide a reasonable gain in ecological 
services  (credit)  that  were  similar  to  those  that  were  lost  (debit).  Kuwait  also  sought 
compensation  for  recreational  beach  losses  which  they  quantified  using  a  CV  survey  and 
suggested  that  the  nature  preserve  would  provide  recreation  opportunities  of  equal  value. 
However,  the  Panel  rejected  this  claim  due  to  technical  problems  with  the  CV  survey  but 
acknowledged that recreation impacts were a legitimate claim. 
The  legal  discussion  between  Iraq  and  the  Panel  provides  interesting  insight  into  the 
treatment of non-market costs. The Panel rejected arguments by Iraq that the interim loss of 
resources have no commercial value ("not traded in the market") and therefore are not financially      13 
 
assessable. Further, Iraq argued that international bodies such as the IOPC Fund have expressly 
rejected the use of "abstract and theoretical methodologies" and that awarding environmental 
restoration  costs  to  claimants  using  EA  would  amount  to  re-writing  international  law.  The 
UNCC ruled against Iraq, noting that international law does not prescribe or reject any specific 
methods for measuring damages and that an interim loss of resources is a valid damage claim as 
envisioned by the Security Council's Resolution 687. The Panel implicitly accepted the use of 
the  EA  method  and  “does  not  consider  that  the  exclusion  of  compensation  for  pure 
environmental damage in some international conventions on civil liability and compensation is a 
valid basis for asserting that international law, in general, prohibits compensation for such 
damage in all cases ...” (UNCCGC 2005 §58) 
EA in the European Union.  
Although we are unaware of EA applications in the EU involving oil or other types of actual 
damage, the 2008 REMEDE project provides illustrative EA case studies (Lipton et al 2008). 
These case studies suggest the EA approach to assess, among other things, marine habitat loss 
from a chemical spill, bird habitat loss from construction of an oil pipeline, and water quality 
degradation from an orphaned mine. These case studies represent the types of environmental 
damages one might expect from an oil spill. Although not specifically tested in any EU court (to 
our knowledge), the REMEDE project methods were explicitly requested by the EC to develop 
defensible approaches for assessing non-market environmental damage, with a preference for 
non-monetary scaling (ELD Annex II 1.2.2). Besides the ELD, these methods and concepts are 
applied under the EU's Habitats Directive (see "interim loss" in EC 2007). 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH 
Given the increasing volume of vessel traffic and subsequent risk of oil spills in the Baltic 
Sea, this paper suggests a transparent and consistent framework for assessing non-market costs of 
oil spills based on the recently completed EC-funded REMEDE project. The EA method from the 
REMEDE project is frequently used to assess oil spill damages in the US and to support UN 
compensation  claims.  The  interdisciplinary  framework  values  environmental  loss  and  scales 
restoration  to  ensure  that  the  full  social  costs  of  oil  spills  are  better  incorporated  into  spill 
prevention decisions made by transport firms. Policies that better incorporate these non-market 
costs -- together with the direct and market costs -- into the social marginal benefits of spill 
prevention will address the market failure associated with the transport industry. Such policies 
will lead to more efficient use of society's scarce resources. Whether this damage assessment 
framework can be legally applied to the context of oil spills in the Baltic remains to be seen, but a 
framework based on the "interim loss" of resources greatly improves the discussion about how to 
address the mounting risk of oil spills in the sensitive environment of the Baltic Sea. 
We suggest a number of policy and research actions: 
-That existing policy frameworks, such as the Baltic Sea Action Plan, consider the full social 
costs of oil spills. We suggest EA as a potential method for assessing non-market costs. 
-Further research should address whether subjecting polluters to ex post restoration costs, 
which are based on ex ante estimates using EA, will accurately capture the social externality that 
arises when oil spills damage a variety of ecosystem services.  
-Future research should focus on reducing the uncertainties inherent in using non-monetary 
metrics to capture welfare losses associated with environmental change, especially given the 
ELD's preference for this scaling approach.       15 
 
-The Swedish environmental code allows for compensation for non-market losses (MB kap 
5§) but authorities appear reluctant to pursue a case because no precedent exists in the court 
system  today.  This  perpetuates  the  status  quo.  We  suggest  that  Swedish  authorities  lead  by 
example and leverage this national legislation to recover direct, market, and non-market costs 
when assessing future environmental damages. If neighboring Baltic states follow suit, a more 
socially optimal level of spill prevention measures may prevail in the Baltic.  
-Future  studies  should  consider  the  incentive  structure  implied  by  compensation  funds 
(government or insurance), which should strike a balance between ensuring public compensation 
for damage and creating the right incentives for polluters.  
-In 2013 the EC will review the effectiveness of the ELD and suggest revisions. We suggest 
that the exemption for oil spills (ELD Art 4(2)) be re-considered. Consistent treatment of all 
types of environmental damage creates better incentives for damage prevention. We support a 
recent ELD evaluation that concluded: "the coverage of the marine environment is incomplete. 
The ELD extends to coastal waters and the territorial sea as regards ‘damage to water’ (through 
the Water Framework Directive) and to protected marine species and Natura2000 sites within 
the jurisdiction of the Member States (extending to the exclusive economic zone and continental 
shelf  where  applicable),  leaving  a  gap  in  the  full  remediation  of  damage  to  the  marine 
environment....  Damage  to  the  marine  environment  due  to  oil  spills  caused  by  oil  drilling 
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